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WHERE’S THE MEAT? A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
ARKANSAS’ LAW PROHIBITING THE USE OF “MEAT” TERMS
ON PLANT – AND CELL – BASED PRODUCTS
Christy Wyatt

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, consumers have increasingly looked for alternatives to
traditional meat products. Consumers often switch to these alternatives
due to concerns for animal welfare, for personal health, or for the
environment.1 Out of this desire, two main types of alternative meat
products have been developed: plant-based meat and cell-based meat.
Plant-based meat has been produced since the mid-1900s and is made by
processing plant sources such as soy and peas.2 Sales of plant-based meat
products have increased drastically over the past couple of years and the
plant-based meat industry was worth $939 million in 2019.3 Cell-based
meat is meat that is grown in a laboratory using animal tissue or stem
cells.4 While cell-based meat products have not yet entered the market,
they are expected to between 2021 and 2025.5 While some consumers are
skeptical about eating lab-grown meat, many consumers are willing to try
cell-based meat as an alternative to meat produced from the slaughter of
animals.6

1. See Shruti Sharma et al., In Vitro Meat Production System: Why and How?, 52 J. FOOD SCI.
TECH. 7599, 7603 – 04 (2015) (stating that pollution from industrial meat production has significantly
impacted climate change, estimates from the FAO stated that the raising of livestock accounted for up to
18% of greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, consuming lab grown meat would likely reduce the need
for factory farming, thus lowering the amount of animal suffering.); see also Julia B. Olayanju, Plantbased Meat Alternatives: Perspectives on Consumer Demands and Future Directions, FORBES (July 30,
2019,
12:07
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/juliabolayanju/2019/07/30/plant-based-meatalternatives-perspectives-on-consumer-demands-and-future-directions/#263e69336daa
[https://perma.cc/7LSZ-F8J8] (stating that consumers are increasingly looking for plant-based meat
alternatives based on environmental, animal welfare, and health concerns).
2. Olayanju, supra note 1; Tara McHugh, How Plant-Based Meat and Seafood are Processed,
FOOD TECH. MAG. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.ift.org/news-and-publications/food-technologymagazine/issues/2019/october/columns/processing-how-plant-based-meat-and-seafood-are-processed
[https://perma.cc/VU7K-GE7C].
3. Retail
Sales
Data,
PLANT
BASED
FOODS
ASS’N,
https://plantbasedfoods.org/marketplace/retail-sales-data/ [https://perma.cc/VAJ5-N3WF] (last visited
Mar. 27, 2020) (retail sales of plant-based meat increased by 18% in 2019 while retail sales of
conventional meat grew by 2.7%).
4. Taylor A. Mayhall, Note, The Meat of the Matter: Regulating a Laboratory-Grown
Alternative, 74 FOOD DRUG L. J. 151, 151 (2019); Sharma et al., supra note 1, at 7600.
5. Sam Danley, Cell-Based Meats Approaching Scalability, FOOD BUS. NEWS (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/15286-cell-based-meats-approaching-scalability
[https://perma.cc/HCV6-K9TN].
6. Mary Ellen Shoup, Survey: How do Consumers feel about Cell Cultured Meat, and Dairy
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As cell-based meat prepares to enter the market and plant-based meat
gains popularity, states are beginning to regulate the use of meat terms,
such as beef, sausage, and chicken, on plant-based and cell-based
products. These regulations vary in how they regulate meat terms.
Examples of how meat terms are regulated for plant-based and cell-based
meat products include forbidding using meat terms in a misleading way,
requiring a disclaimer when a meat term is used, or prohibiting using meat
terms altogether.7 As of May 2019, twenty-five states had introduced or
passed regulations limiting the use of meat terms on plant-based and/or
cell-based meat products.8 Many of these regulations have been
challenged by plant-based meat producers as unconstitutional because
they violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.9 Cell-based meat
producers have not yet challenged these regulations. This is likely because
cell-based meat will not enter the market for at least another year, and
producers are not prepared to spend money on litigation at this stage.
This Article will focus on an Arkansas statute banning the use of meat
terms on plant-based and cell-based products (“Act 501”) and the case
challenging its constitutionality, Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman.10 Act
501 is relevant because Turtle Island is currently being litigated and Act
501 has a complete ban on the use of meat terms on plant-based and cellbased products.11 While Act 501 is the focus of this Article, the
Minus
the
Cows,
FOODNAVIGATOR
(Dec.
13,
2019),
https://www.foodnavigatorusa.com/Article/2019/12/13/Survey-Are-consumers-warming-up-to-the-idea-of-cell-cultured-meat
[https://perma.cc/9HW6-JZGY] (stating that 46% of consumers over the age of 55 are unwilling to try
cell-based meat and 26% of consumers between the age 18-34 years are unwilling to try cell-based meat).
7. See Andrew Wimer, Victory for Vegan Burgers: New Mississippi Labeling Regulations will
Not Punish Plant-Based Meat, INST. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2019), https://ij.org/press-release/victory-forvegan-burgers-new-mississippi-labeling-regulations-will-not-punish-plant-based-meat/
[https://perma.cc/72VT-FS8L] (stating that Upton Natural v. Bryant was dropped because the Mississippi
Department of Agriculture plans to replace the regulation forbidding the use of meat terms on plant-based
foods with a revised regulation allowing meat terms on plant-based products as long as the label includes
disclaimers such as “meat-free,” “plant-based,” “vegetarian,” etc. as well); see also Turtle Island Foods
v. Richardson, No. 2:18-cv-04173, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224840, at *17-18 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2019)
(Order denying motion for preliminary injunction stating that Missouri’s regulation is likely constitutional
because they only prohibit using meat terms in a misleading way. Plant-based meat producers can use
meat terms on their products as long as they aren’t using the terms in a misleading way.); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 2-1-305(6) (2020) (forbidding the use of meat terms on products that are not derived from
slaughtered animals).
8. Elaine Watson, Plant-Based and Cell-Cultured ‘Meat’ Labeling under Attack in 25 States,
FOODNAVIGATOR (May 29, 2019), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2019/05/29/Plant-basedand-cell-cultured-meat-labeling-under-attack-in-25-states [https://perma.cc/3EPF-YPUA].
9. See, e.g., Wimer, supra note 7 (Upton Naturals filed a First Amendment case in Mississippi);
see e.g., Richardson, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224840, at *3 (Order denying motion for preliminary
injunction); see, e.g., Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, No. 4:19-cv-514-KGB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
225017, at *25-26 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 11, 2019) (order granting preliminary injunction).
10. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Turtle Island v. Soman, No. 4:19-cv-514KGB (E.D. Ark. July 22, 2019).
11. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(6) (2020) (forbidding the use of meat terms on products that are
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recommendations on legislating meat terms on plant-based and cell-based
meat products apply to all states who are considering restricting the use
of meat terms.
Part II-A of this Article describes how plant-based and cell-based
meats are manufactured. Part II-B provides an overview of state statutes
that restrict the use of meat terms on plant-based and cell-based meats and
gives a detailed description of Act 501. Parts II-C and D provide
background information on the constitutional law that both parties in
Turtle Island v. Soman use to argue whether Act 501 is constitutional. Part
II-E describes the actual arguments both parties make in Turtle Island v.
Soman. Parts III-A through C analyze why Act 501 should be found
unconstitutional based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Part IIID evaluates alternatives to completely banning the use of meat terms on
plant-based and cell-based products. Finally, Part IV concludes that plantbased meat manufacturers should be able to use meat terms on their
products as long as the use of the meat term is not misleading, and that
cell-based meat manufacturers should be able to include meat terms on
their products with an appropriate disclaimer.
II. BACKGROUND
Part II provides background information necessary to analyze Turtle
Island Foods SPC v. Soman. Part A gives a brief history of cell-based
meat and explains how both cell-based meat and plant-based meat are
produced. Part B gives an overview of state statutes that prevent plantand cell-based products from using meat terms on their labels, focusing
on Act 501. Parts C and D explain the constitutional law that Turtle Island
uses to argue that Act 501 is unconstitutional: Part C outlines First
Amendment rights surrounding commercial speech and the Central
Hudson Test and Part D explains the Fourteenth Amendment’s
prohibition on vague statutes. Finally, Part E provides the facts
surrounding Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, as well as the legal
arguments of both parties.
A. Cell-Based Meat versus Plant-Based Meat
Cell-based meat is meat that is grown in a laboratory instead of
produced through the slaughter of animals.12 Cell-based meat is thought
to be an environmentally friendly alternative to eating meat from
livestock, as well as an improvement in animal welfare.13 The National
not derived from slaughtered animals).
12. Mayhall, supra note 4, at 152.
13. See Sharma et al., supra note 1, at 7603 – 04 (stating that pollution from industrial meat
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Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) was the first to fund
research experimenting with lab-grown meat in the early 2000s.14 NASA
began to research cell-based meat with hopes to replace “pasty space
food” with a better alternative. 15 Within a few years, other groups and
individuals began to fund cell-based meat research as an alternative to
meat produced from livestock.16 In 2013, the first lab-grown burger was
produced.17 However, this burger cost $300,000 to produce, making it
unrealistic for cell-based meat to enter the public market at that time.18
Since 2013, the costs of producing cell-based meat decreased from
$300,000 to $100 per hamburger.19 Currently, cell-based meat has not
entered the public market because of cost and other scale-up issues, but it
is expected to enter the market in the near future.20
There are currently two techniques to produce cell-cultured meat: the
self-organizing technique and the scaffold-based technique.21 The selforganizing technique takes muscle tissue from an animal and puts it on a
medium containing nutrients.22 The nutrients in the medium allow for the
tissue to continue to grow and develop into meat. 23
The scaffold-based technique starts with stem cells instead of muscle
tissue.24 First, stem cells are taken from an animal. 25 The cells are then

production has significantly impacted climate change, estimates from the FAO stated that the raising of
livestock accounted for up to 18% of greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, consuming lab grown meat
would likely reduce the need for factory farming, thus lowering the amount of animal suffering.).
14. Mayhall, supra note 4, at 157 (citing Michael Specter, Test-Tube Burgers, THE NEW YORKER
(May 23, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/23/test-tube-burgers).
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Michael Specter, Test-Tube Burgers, THE NEW YORKER (May 23, 2011),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/23/test-tube-burgers.);
Josh
Schonwald,
The
Frankenburger is Coming Sooner than you Think Thanks to Google, TIME MAG. (Aug. 15, 2014),
http://time.com/3118571/lab-grown-meat-frankenburger-google/) (stating that in 2008 People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals announced a competition awarding $1 million to the first group you could
create a cell-based chicken product. Sergey Brin, the co-founder of google, and others have also provided
funding to cell-based meat research.).
17. Tom Ireland, The Artificial Meat Factory – The Science of your Synthetic Supper,
SCIENCEFOCUS (May 23, 2019), https://www.sciencefocus.com/future-technology/the-artificial-meatfactory-the-science-of-your-synthetic-supper/ [https://perma.cc/3TS4-GYPK].
18. Id.
19. Danley, supra note 5.
20. Id. (stating that multiple companies are expecting to have cell-based meat products in the
market between 2021 – 2025).
21. Sharma et al., supra note 1, at 7600.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. How
it’s
Made,
MOSA
MEAT,
https://www.mosameat.com/technology
[https://perma.cc/N9GE-KGJZ] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) (the cells taken are called “myosatellite” cells.
Myosatellite cells function to create new protein in animals. Mosa Meat is the producer of the cell-based
burger made in 2013).
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placed in a medium that will allow them to multiply.26 To help the cells
multiply, the medium is placed in a bioreactor.27 The bioreactor creates a
favorable environment for cells to multiply.28 As the cells grow in the
bioreactor, the cells attach to a scaffold, which is needed to spur cell
multiplication.29 Once the cells have multiplied, the medium is changed
to stop feeding the cells’ growth factors.30 At that point, muscle cells
merge into “myotubes,” or a muscle fiber. 31 Myotubes are then merged
together to form meat.32
Unlike cell-based meats, plant-based meats are derived from plant
sources such as soy, peas, and potatoes.33 There are many ways to process
plant-based meats.34 Two popular methods of producing plant-based meat
are extrusion and shear cell processing. 35
Extrusion occurs when food materials are fed into a barrel.36 Next, a
screw within the barrel applies pressure and pushes the materials through
an orifice creating the desired shape and texture of the food product.37
When making plant-based meats, the temperature of the barrel, the speed
of the screw, and the length and shape of the die (the part of the extruder
that contains the orifice the food product is pushed through) will alter the
proteins found in the plant source, giving the plant proteins a texture
similar to meat.38
Shear cell processing uses a Couette Cell to process plant proteins.39 A
Couette Cell has a large cone with a smaller cone inside.40 A mixture of
plant proteins, water, salt, and gluten are placed between the two cones.41
After the space between the two cones has been filled with the plant
protein mixture, the two cones are heated using an oil bath.42 The inner
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Sharma et al., supra note 1, at 7602; see Ireland, supra note 17 (stating that a large reason that
the cell-based meat has not entered the market is that it is challenging to produce a bioreactor large enough
to produce meat at an industrial level).
29. Sharma et al., supra note 1, at 7602.
30. How it’s Made, supra note 25.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See McHugh, supra note 2.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. H.G. Ramachandra rao & M.L. Thejaswini, Extrusion Technology: A Novel Method of Food
Processing, 2 INT’L J. OF INNOVATIVE SCI., ENGINEERING, & TECH. 358, 361-62 (2015).
37. Id. at 362.
38. McHugh, supra note 2.
39. Id.
40. Georgios A. Krintiras et al., Production of Structured Soy-Based Meat Analogues using Simple
Shear and Heat in a Couette Cell, 160 J. FOOD ENGINEERING 34, 35 (2015).
41. Id. at 36.
42. Id. at 35.
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cone then rotates, putting pressure on the plant protein mixture. 43 The heat
and pressure alter the plant proteins, giving the proteins a texture similar
to meat.44
B. State Laws Prohibiting Plant-Based and Cell-Based Meats from
using Meat Terms
Multiple states have either passed laws or are considering passing laws
forbidding food producers from using meat language on their products
unless the product actually contains meat from a slaughtered animal.45
Additionally, multiple state laws, including Act 501 in Arkansas, have
been challenged in court.46 Some of these cases have ended in settlements
requiring the state to revise their statute to allow plant-based products to
use meat terms as long as the label includes a disclaimer that notifies
customers that the product is plant-based and does not actually include
meat from livestock.47 The rest of this Part will focus on Act 501.
On March 18, 2019, Arkansas passed Act 501, which forbids the use
of meat terms on plant-based and cell-based products.48 The statute states
that if a person “represent[s] [an] agricultural product as a meat or meat
product when the agricultural product is not derived from harvested
livestock, poultry, or cervids,” the producer is misbranding their
product.49 The statute defines a “meat product” as an “agricultural product
that is edible by humans and made wholly or in part from meat or another
portion of a livestock, poultry, or cervid carcass.”50 “‘Livestock’ means
swine, bovine, sheep, and goats.”51 “Poultry” is defined as “domestic

43. Id.
44. McHugh, supra note 2.
45. Jessi Devenyns, Mississippi and South Dakota Criminalize Misuse of the Term ‘Meat,’
FOODDIVE (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.fooddive.com/news/mississippi-and-south-dakota-criminalizemisuse-of-term-meat/552021/ [https://perma.cc/S86B-8HMF] (In addition to Arkansas, this article states
that Montana, Mississippi and South Dakota have all passed laws that prohibit labeling products as meat
that are not from a slaughtered animal. Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming have pending legislation as of April 2019).
46. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-2, 10, Upton’s Naturals Co. v.
Bryant, No. 3:19-cv-462-HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. July 1, 2019) (arguing that MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-3515, stating that “A plant-based or insect-based food product shall not be labeled as a meat or a meat food
product, is unconstitutional).
47. See Wimer, supra note 7 (stating that Upton Natural v. Bryant was dropped because the
Mississippi Department of Agriculture plans to replace the regulation forbidding the use of meat terms on
plant-based foods with a revised regulation allowing meat terms on plant-based products as long as the
label includes terms like “meat-free,” “plant-based,” “vegetarian,” etc. as well).
48. H.B. 1407, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019).
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(6) (2020).
50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-302(8) (2020).
51. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-302(6) (2020).
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birds that are edible by humans.” 52 Finally, “cervid” means coming from
deer, elk, and other animals within the deer family. 53 Additionally, it is
considered misbranding if a person uses a “term that is the same as or
similar to a term that has been used or defined historically in reference to
a specific agricultural product” on a product different from the specific
agricultural product.54 Questions have arisen surrounding what “similar”
means and whether incorrect spellings of specific agricultural products
are too similar to be used on plant- and cell-based products.55
C. First Amendment Protections for Commercial Speech and the Central
Hudson Test
The First Amendment states “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech.”56 Commercial speech was unprotected under the
First Amendment until the Supreme Court decided Bigelow v. Virginia57
in 1975.58 However, after Bigelow, it was not clear what was considered
commercial speech.59 To help determine whether speech is commercial,
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.60 presented three factors for courts
to consider when determining if speech is commercial. Speech is likely
commercial speech if the speech is an advertisement, if the speech
references a product, and if there is an economic motivation for the
speech.61 The three factors are balanced together and are not
determinative on their own.62 However, even today it can be challenging
to determine whether speech is commercial speech. 63

52. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-302(14) (2020).
53. Definition of “Cervid,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/cervid [https://perma.cc/S92D-7SJ8] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).
54. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(10) (2020).
55. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 10, at 14(stating that Tofurky is
unsure whether they can market their products as chick’n because it is unclear whether it is too close to
chick’n.); see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
14, Turtle Island Foodsv. Soman, No. 4:19-cv-514-KGB (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2019) (stating Tofurky is
uncertain whether they can use Tofurky as their brand because it may be too similar to the term turkey).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
58. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §11.3.7.1 (5th ed.
2015).
59. Id. at §11.3.7.2 (stating post Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. (a case decided one year after Bigelow) only stated that commercial speech was speech that
“proposes a commercial transaction”).
60. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
61. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
62. Id. at 67.
63. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58, §11.3.7.2 (stating that even while the factors given by Bolger
v. Young Drug Products Corp. to determine whether speech is commercial speech are helpful, they do not
solve problems such as if image advertisements are commercial speech).
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It is important to determine if speech is commercial because
commercial speech is given less protection than expressive speech.64
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
provided the test to determine if a state statute limiting commercial speech
is unconstitutional.65 First, for commercial speech to be protected, the
speech must “concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” 66 Second,
if the commercial speech is protected, then there must be a substantial
government interest in limiting the speech.67 Finally, if there is a
substantial government interest, the statute must “directly advance[] the
governmental interest asserted,” and the statute cannot be “more
extensive than is necessary to serve [the governmental] interest.” 68
If the commercial speech is misleading, the government can ban the
speech entirely.69 If the commercial speech is not misleading, then the
next two factors of the Central Hudson test are evaluated.70 Commercial
speech can be shown to be misleading either by inferring that the speech
will mislead consumers through how the company advertises their
products, or by showing that the consumers have actually been misled by
the commercial speech.71 Additionally, if the commercial speech has a
tendency to be inherently misleading, the state can place restrictions on
the speech to prevent the speech being used in a misleading way.72
The second prong of the Central Hudson Test states that there must be
a substantial government interest to regulate non-misleading commercial
speech.73 For the government to pass the second prong of the Central
Hudson Test, the government must prove that the interest stated is real
and that the speech being regulated is truly harmful.74 The government
cannot use “unsupported assumptions” to prove that the stated interest is
substantial.75 Finally, the courts must evaluate whether the stated interest
is actually served by the regulation being evaluated.76
64. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).
65. Id. at 566.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
70. Id. at 203-04.
71. Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 552, 572 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (quoting 1-800411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045, 1056 (8th Cir. 2014))(order granting preliminary
injunction for Turtle Foods stating Arkansas cannot enforce Act 501).
72. In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 203 (In the case of being potentially misleading, the restrictions can
only limit the speech in ways that prevent the speech from being used in the misleading way).
73. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
74. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 143 (1994).
75. Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 64849 (1985)).
76. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
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The final prong of the Central Hudson Test requires that the regulation
directly and narrowly advances the stated government interest. 77 If the
regulation only provides “ineffective or remote support” for the stated
interest, the regulation fails this prong of the Central Hudson Test.78
Additionally, “if the government interest could be served as well by a
more limited restriction on commercial speech,” the regulation fails the
third prong of the Central Hudson Test.79 This does not mean that the
government must always use the least restrictive regulation, only that
there must be a balance between the government’s stated interest and the
restrictions used to support that interest. 80 If there are less intrusive
options to promote the state interest than the regulation being evaluated,
the regulation fails the third prong of the Central Hudson Test.81
D. Fourteenth Amendment and Vagueness
The Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”82 Under
the Due Process Clause, a law is unenforceable if the law is vague.83 The
reason that vague laws violate due process is because people must be
aware of what conduct is prohibited so that they can avoid violating the
law.84 According to Justice Thurgood Marshall, “vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing a fair warning.”85 Additionally, vague laws
require that judges, police officers, and other officials make subjective
determinations on what the law means, increasing the likelihood of an
arbitrary determination of whether a person broke the law.86 Regulations
can be flexible and have a reasonable breadth without violating the due
process clause as long as it is clear what the regulation as a whole
prohibits.87 The degree of vagueness that a court will tolerate in a
regulation depends on the nature of the regulation.88 For example, when
a regulation restricts constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, the

77. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 557 U.S. at 566.
78. Id. at 564.
79. Id.
80. Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 552, 573 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (quoting Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001))(order granting preliminary injunction for Turtle Foods
stating Arkansas cannot enforce Act 501).
81. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
83. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 108-09.
87. Id. at 110.
88. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
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vagueness test applied is more stringently.89
E. Turtle Island Foods, SPC (dba The Tofurky Company) v. Soman
1. Facts of the Case
Turtle Island Foods, SPC (doing business as The Tofurky Company)
(“Tofurky”) filed a complaint against Nikhil Soman, the director of the
Arkansas Bureau of Standards, on July 22, 2019, arguing that Act 501 is
unconstitutional.90 Tofurky produces and sells plant-based food products
nationwide, including in Arkansas.91 Tofurky believes that their
marketing strategy and ability to communicate what their products
resemble to consumers would be inhibited by Act 501.92 Tofurky believes
that Act 501 is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment,
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Dormant Commerce Clause. 93
Arkansas argues that Act 501 is constitutional, 94 and that Tofurky does
not have standing to bring this suit.95 Each parties’ Central Hudson Test
and vagueness arguments, described in parts ii and iii, are based on
arguments made to grant or deny a preliminary injunction prohibiting
Arkansas from enforcing Act 501 until the case is completed. 96
2. Central Hudson Test Arguments
For the Central Hudson Test to apply, the regulated speech must be
deemed commercial speech.97 Both parties agree that the speech is
89. Id. at 499.
90. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note10, at 1.
91. Id. at 2.
92. See id. at 15 (stating that Tofurky can’t market its products online using meat terms because it
advertises in Arkansas and burdens interstate commerce in general).
93. Id. at 13-15. This paper will not discuss the Dormant Commerce clause because it is not as
significant of an argument as the First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges in Tofurky’s argument.
94. See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Turtle Island
Foods v. Soman, No. 4:19-cv-514-KGB (E.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2019) (stating that Tofurky is unlikely to
succeed on its First and Fourteenth Amendment claims).
95. Id. at 8-9. (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158-59 (2014)) (stating
that to be able to challenge Act 501 Tofurky must have a “credible threat of prosecution under Act 501.
Tofurky has not changed its labels and Arkansas has not tried to enforce Act 501 against Tofurky.
Therefore, Tofurky does not currently face a credible threat of prosecution.).
96. See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 94; see
also Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 55. To
grant a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff only has to prove that they are likely to win the case. That is
why both Tofurky’s and Arkansas’s arguments use the terminology that Act 501 is likely or unlikely to
be found constitutional. See Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552, 570 (E.D. Ark.
2019) (order granting preliminary injunction).
97. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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commercial speech.98 Turning to whether the commercial speech is
protected, Tofurky alleges that Act 501 fails the Central Hudson Test.
First, Tofurky argues that the commercial speech restricted by Act 501 is
protected under the First Amendment because the speech, Tofurky’s
labels and advertisements, is not misleading to consumers.99 Tofurky
specifically argues that meat terms have been used on plant-based food
labels for decades.100 Additionally, Tofurky asserts that they always label
their products to clearly show that their products are plant-based.101
Tofurky provides multiple pictures of their labels to demonstrate that their
labels effectively communicate to consumers that Tofurky’s products are
plant-based.102 Therefore, it would be “absurdly patronizing” to think that
a customer would not know that Tofurky’s products are plant-based.103
Next, Tofurky argues that Act 501 does not advance a substantial
government interest.104 Tofurky contends that there is no evidence
demonstrating consumers are confused by how plant-based meats are
labeled.105 Therefore, Tofurky argues the Arkansas government has not
proven that there is real harm in allowing plant-based meats to use meat
related terms.106 Tofurky also argues that there is no evidence showing
that Act 501 will actually alleviate any consumer confusion regarding the
use of meat terms on plant-based foods.107 Tofurky believes that Act 501
will actually lead to increased consumer confusion because Tofurky
needs to use meat terms to help consumers identify what their plant-based
products are supposed to taste like.108
Finally, Tofurky argues that Act 501 is not “appropriately tailored to

98. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra
note 55, at 6; see also Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
94, at 13 (both briefs argue their First Amendment cases assuming that Tofurky’s labels are commercial
speech).
99. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
55, at 7.
100. Id.
101. Id. (specifically stating that it uses the label “all vegan,” “plant based,” “vegetarian, “veggie,”
and “made with pasture raised plants”).
102. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note10, at 10-11 (shows
examples of Tofurky’s labels. All the labels contain that the products are plant-based or vegetarian).
103. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
55, at 7.
104. Id.
105. Id.at 8.
106. Id. (Tofurky analogizes Act 501 with statutes forbidding the use of dairy terms on non-dairy
products, like soymilk, in which courts stated that there was no reason to believe a reasonable consumer
would think there was dairy milk in plant-based milk just because “milk was on the label.” E.g., Gitson
v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 13-cv-01333-WHO, 2015 WL 9121232 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015)).
107. Id. at 9.
108. Id. (Tofurky argues that it would have to replace “sausage” with a term like “Tube” which
does not help consumers determine what the product is supposed to taste like).
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any substantial government interest.”109 Tofurky alleges that “a blanket
restriction” on all meat terms is much more restrictive than is necessary
to alleviate consumer confusion. 110 Tofurky believes that the Arkansas
government could prevent consumer confusion by requiring certain
disclosures on plant-based foods instead of restricting the use of meat
terms.111 Requiring certain disclosures more adequately tailors Arkansas’
stated interest of preventing consumer confusion.112 Additionally,
Tofurky asserts that there are already multiple federal laws that prevent
plant-based food producers from misleading consumers by using meat
terms in a misleading way.113
Arkansas argues that Act 501 passes the Central Hudson Test and that
Tofurky’s speech is not protected under the First Amendment.114
Arkansas first contends that Tofurky’s labels are not protected by the First
Amendment because Tofurky’s labels are misleading.115 Arkansas states
that Tofurky’s labels are inherently misleading because when Tofurky
uses meat terms, the portion of the label stating that the product is plantbased is often very small, while the meat term is very large.116
Next, Arkansas argues that even if Tofurky’s labels are protected by
the First Amendment, Act 501 still passes the Central Hudson Test. First,
Arkansas states that the Act 501Act 501 has a substantial government
interest in “protecting consumers from deceptive and misleading
advertisement[s].”117 Additionally, Arkansas asserts that Act 501
“directly and materially advance[s] the state interest.”118 Act 501 directly
states that food producers cannot mislead consumers by labeling a product
as something it is not, and stating that labeling a plant-based meat product
as a meat product would mislead consumers.119
Finally, Arkansas argues that Act 501 is as “restrictive as necessary”

109. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
55, at 10.
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 12.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 11 (Tofurky states the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act already prohibit mislabeling food products in a way that is misleading).
114. See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 94, at
13.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 15-16 (for example, Tofurky’s “slow roasted Chick’n” does not state that the product is
plant-based except for in the bottom corner of the box in small print). Arkansas does not state how they
expect Tofurky to label their products, but examples could include “Italian spiced soy links” instead of
“plant-based Italian Sausage”
117. Id. at 18 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-301) (This code lays out the specific purpose of Act
501, to protect against misleading advertisements).
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss3/6

12

Wyatt: Where's the Meat? A Constitutional Analysis...

2021]

WHERE’S THE MEAT?

743

to further the substantial interest because Act 501 identifies the specific
words and descriptors it intends to prohibit. 120 Arkansas argues that
Tofurky’s argument that disclosures would be a narrower restriction that
would achieve the same goal as Act 501 is not accurate because using
meat terms on plant-based and cell-based products is still misleading and
could confuse consumers.121
3. Fourteenth Amendment Vagueness Argument
Tofurky believes Act 501 is unconstitutional because Act 501 is vague
and violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 122 Tofurkey argues that the
section of Act 501 that prohibits the use of a “term that is the same or
similar to a term that has been used or defined historically in reference to
a specific agricultural product”123 is vague because Act 501 does not
clarify how similar is too similar. 124 Additionally, Tofurky argues that
there are many meat terms that have multiple meanings and Act 501 is
not clear on whether those terms can be used on non-meat labels.125 For
example, meat can be used to either describe an “edible portion of a
livestock, poultry, or cervid carcass,” or meat can be used to describe the
edible portions of a fruit.126 Tofurky asserts that the vagueness in Act 501
regarding “similar terms” and whether meat terms with multiple
meanings can be used in non-meat products will give the state too much
discretion in determining whether a term used on a plant-based or cellbased product violates Act 501. 127 Therefore, Tofurky argues that Act 501
is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.128
Arkansas argues that the Tofurky is unlikely to succeed on its
Fourteenth Amendment vagueness challenge. 129 Arkansas states that the
statute, as a whole, defines what each term means and specifies the exact
activities that are regulated by Act 501.130 The only portion of the statute
120. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 94, at 21
(For example, Act 501 specifically states that a product using pork or pork terms must be derived from
swine).
121. Id. at 22.
122. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
55, at 13.
123. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(10) (2020).
124. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
55, at 14 (questioning whether the term “beetballs” is too similar to “meatballs,” and whether Tofurky
would have to change its brand name because “Tofurky” is too similar to “turkey”).
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id. at 13-14.
127. Id. at 14.
128. Id.
129. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 94, at 23.
130. Id. at 24 (For example, the statute explicitly defines beef, beef product, pork, poultry, etc).
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that Tofurky argues is unconstitutionally vague is the prohibition of “any
term that is the same or similar to a term . . . in reference to a specified
agricultural product.”131 Arkansas asserts that even if the court agrees that
this specific section of Act 501 is vague, it is not enough to declare Act
501 unconstitutional in its entirety because the rest of Act 501 is clear in
what it requires.132
III. ANALYSIS
Part A of this Section analyzes whether Act 501 violates the First
Amendment under the Central Hudson Test as it applies to plant-based
meat products. Part B analyzes whether Act 501 violates the First
Amendment under the Central Hudson Test as it applies to cell-based
meat products. Part C analyzes whether Act 501 is unconstitutionally
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, Part D analyzes other narrower alternatives to Act 501 that
Arkansas could implement while furthering its interest of ensuring
customers are not misled by advertising of plant-based and cell-based
products.
A. Act 501 Should be Found Unconstitutional Based on the Central
Hudson Test for Plant-Based Meats
Act 501 will should be found to violate plant-based meat
manufacturers’ rights under the First Amendment based on the Central
Hudson Test. First, it is unlikely that most plant-based products using
meat terms are using meat terms in ways that are inherently misleading.
On the contrary, many producers of plant-based meat want consumers to
know that their products are plant-based because consumers are
increasingly looking to purchase plant-based meats.133 Therefore, most
plant-based meat products’ labels will include a disclaimer that the
product is vegetarian, vegan, or plant-based because it appeals to
consumers and encourages sales.134 Consumers are not likely to be
confused or misled if the packaging of plant-based meats clearly identifies
that the product is plant-based. An example of a label that would clearly
identify the plant-based meat products is “Vegan Italian Sausage.”
131. Id. (ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(10) is the section of the statute Tofurky questioned).
132. Id.
133. See Olayanju, supra note 1 (stating that consumers are increasingly looking for plant-based
meat alternatives based on environmental, animal welfare, and health concerns); see also Retail Sales
Data, supra note 3 (Stating that retail sales of plant-based meat increased by eighteen percent in 2019
while retail sales of conventional meat grew by 2.7%).
134. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note10, at 10-11 (shows
examples of Tofurky’s labels. All the labels contain that the products are plant-based or vegetarian).
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Additionally, plant-based meats have been available since the early to
mid-1900s.135 Therefore, most consumers are likely familiar with plantbased meats and will not be misled into believing that labeled plant-based
meat is meat produced from the slaughter of livestock. However, there is
still the potential that plant-based meat producers could mislead
consumers by advertising their products without stating that the product
is plant-based or vegetarian. Because using meat terms on plant-based
meats is not inherently misleading, the remaining factors of the Central
Hudson Test must be evaluated.136
The second prong of the Central Hudson Test requires that the
Arkansas government had a substantial government interest when they
passed Act 501.137 Arkansas states that the purpose of Act 501 is to
prevent consumer confusion due to false advertisements.138 Arkansas’
stated interest is substantial, and Act 501 would protect consumers from
believing that plant-based and cell-based meat products are actually meat
products made from the slaughter of livestock. Therefore, it is likely that
Act 501 would pass the second prong of the Central Hudson Test.
However, Tofurky argues that there are already laws preventing the
misleading labeling of food products.139 Therefore, Act 501 is not
furthering Arkansas’ stated interest because it was already illegal for
Tofurky to mislead their customers by labeling their products as though
they came from livestock.140 Additionally, Tofurky asserts that Act 501
goes against Arkansas’ stated interest because Act 501 actually causes
confusion since they would not be able to adequately describe their plantbased products resembling meat.141
Tofurky’s arguments that Act 501 is unconstitutional are weak. First,
Tofurky’s argument that there is no need for Act 501 because there are
existing statutes forbidding misleading advertising is inadequate because

135. Olayanju, supra note 1.
136. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (if speech
is inherently misleading, the speech is not protected by the First Amendment, if the speech is not
inherently misleading then the remaining prongs of the Central Hudson Test is evaluated).
137. Id.
138. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 94, at 18
(citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-301) (This code lays out the specific purpose of Act 501, to protect against
misleading advertisements).
139. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
55, at 11; see 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provision stating that a food is
misbranded if its label is misleading); see also 21 U.S.C. § 601(n)(1) (Federal Meat Inspection Act stating
that misleading label makes a meat product misbranded); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Federal Trade
Commission Act stating that deceptive practices affecting commerce are illegal).
140. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
55, at 11.
141. Id. at 9. (Tofurky argues that it would have to replace “sausage” with a term like “Tube” which
does not help consumers determine what the product is supposed to taste like).
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Act 501 is more restrictive then the federal statutes forbidding misleading
advertising. Act 501 specifically restricts how plant-based and cell-based
meat producers can label their products. Additionally, Act 501 attempts
to prevent consumers from thinking that plant-based and cell-based meat
products are meat from slaughtered livestock. The federal laws are broad,
and it is logical that Arkansas wants to implement more restrictions
regarding specific areas of the food industry to protect consumers from a
specific type of misleading label. Second, Tofurky’s argument stating that
Act 501 is actually creating confusion because they cannot properly label
their products is ineffective as well because Tofurky could find creative
ways to describe their products. The new terms may be harder to come up
with, but it is not impossible. For example, Tofurky could call a product
“tofu links with Italian spices” instead of “plant-based Italian
Sausage.”142 Because Tofurky’s arguments are weak, Act 501 should pass
the second prong of the Central Hudson Test.
The final prong of the Central Hudson Test requires that Act 501
directly advance Arkansas’ stated interest and be no more restrictive than
necessary to achieve its interest of keeping consumers from being
misled.143 This prong is where the real issues of Act 501 emerge. While
prohibiting the use of meat terms on plant-based meats directly advances
Arkansas’ interest of stopping consumers from being misled, there are
multiple alternatives to Act 501 that are narrower and will achieve
Arkansas’ stated goal of preventing plant-based meat producers from
confusing consumers. Instead of forbidding plant-based meat producers
from using meat terms altogether, Arkansas could require that plant-based
meat products include a disclaimer on their label, right before the meat
term and in the same size font, that identifies that the product is plantbased.144 Additionally, Arkansas could require that meat terms cannot be
used in a way that would misrepresent a product as meat when it is not.145
Under a statute that allows meat terms on products as long as it does not
misrepresent what the product is, a plant-based product could call its
product “sausage” as long as the packaging also makes clear that product
142. Tofurky did raise concerns in their argument that Act 501 is vague surrounding whether terms
like patty or links could be used because they are often associated with meat products along with others.
However, when terms have been used in multiple ways for an extended period of time, it would be hard
to argue that consumers automatically associate that term with meat and cause confusion. See id. at 1314.
143. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
144. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
55, at 12 (suggesting that Arkansas requires certain disclosures instead of forbidding the use of meat terms
on plant-based products).
145. See Turtle Island Foods v. Richardson, No. 2:18-cv-04173, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224840, at
*17 - 18 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2019) (Order denying motion for preliminary injunction stating that
Missouri’s regulation is likely constitutional because they only prohibit designating a non-meat product
as a meat product, not using meat terms on non-meat products).
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is plant-based. Manufacturers would have flexibility in determining how
to notify customers that their product is plant based. Even though Act 501
does not have to be the narrowest regulation available, 146 Act 501 does
not properly balance the restrictions implemented with furthering the
government interest because including a disclaimer or stating that a meat
term cannot be used in a misleading way is an equally effective and
narrower restriction. Part III-D of this article discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of these narrower regulations. Therefore, Act 501 should
be found unconstitutional under the Central Hudson Test.
B. Act 501 is Likely to be Found Unconstitutional Based on the Central
Hudson Test for Cell-Based Meats
Turtle Island Foods does not discuss cell-based meats, but it is likely
that once cell-based meats enter the market, cell-based meat producers
will bring suits alleging that statutes prohibiting the use of meat terms on
cell-based meat products are unconstitutional. Currently there are no
cases questioning the constitutionality of state statutes forbidding the use
of meat terms on cell-based products.147 While many of the same
arguments used in the previous section apply to cell-based meats, there
are complications that make the Central Hudson analysis more difficult
when applied to cell-based meats. This analysis uses Act 501 as an
example of how a court might analyze whether statutes restricting the use
of meat terms on cell-based products are constitutional if a cell-based
meat producer challenges the constitutionality of these statutes.
First, cell-based meat labels are more likely to mislead consumers than
plant-based meat labels. Unlike plant-based meat that has been in the
market for decades,148 cell-based meat has not yet entered the market and
will be a completely novel product once it does.149 Consumers may not
understand what cell-based meat is when it is introduced in the market.
Therefore, a label that simply states “cell-based meat” may still mislead
customers who are unfamiliar with the product. Courts may find that
146. Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552, 573 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (quoting
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001))(order granting preliminary injunction for
Turtle Foods stating Arkansas cannot enforce Act 501).
147. Cell-based meat producers are most likely not litigating the many state regulations because it
has not entered the market yet. Therefore, since the regulations could change or the labeling of cell-based
meat could be regulated federally, it is logical for cell-based meat producers to wait to litigate until they
are ready to put their products on the market. Because plant-based products are completely different
products than cell-based meat products, plant-based meat producers are unlikely to spend additional time
or money litigating whether cell-based meat producers should be able to label their products as “meat.”
See Danley, supra note 5 (stating that multiple companies are not expecting to have cell-based meat
products in the market until sometime between 2021 – 2025).
148. Olayanju, supra note 1.
149. Danley, supra note 5.
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using meat terms on cell-based meat labels, without a disclaimer
explaining what cell-based meat is, is inherently misleading because
consumers may think that cell-based meat is still meat from livestock.150
If a court determines that meat terms used by a cell-based meat
manufacturer are inherently misleading, it will not be protected under the
First Amendment and the state can prohibit the use of those meat terms
without applying the rest of the Central Hudson Test. However, not all
meat terms used on cell-based meat products are necessarily inherently
misleading. For example, if the label clearly states that the cell-based meat
is “meat made from growing animal cells in a lab,” it would be difficult
to argue that consumers would be inherently misled by the use of the term
“meat” on the label. Because meat terms can be used on cell-based meat
labels without misleading consumers and Act 501 bans all meat terms
from being used, courts will likely determine that using meat terms on
cell-based meat is not misleading and, therefore, will evaluate whether
Act 501 is unconstitutional by looking at the other two prongs of the
Central Hudson Test.
For the same reasons described in the analysis of plant-based meat,
courts will likely find that Arkansas had a substantial interest when they
passed Act 501 of protecting consumers from being misled, and that Act
501 directly furthers that interest by banning the use of meat terms on
cell-based meat products.151 However, Act 501 once again runs into
issues when analyzing whether it is no more restrictive than necessary to
further Arkansas’ interest of protecting customers from being misled.152
First, like plant-based meats, there are less restrictive regulations that
Arkansas could implement to further the same goal with regards to cellbased meats, such as requiring a disclaimer or that the meat term cannot
be used in a misleading way. However, because cell-based meat products
are new and consumers may not understand what cell-based meat is,
simply requiring a disclaimer may not adequately keep consumers from
being misled from thinking cell-based meat is actually meat made from
the slaughter of livestock. Therefore, prohibiting the use of meat terms
may be the easiest way to guarantee consumers are not misled into
thinking that cell-based meat is meat derived from slaughtering livestock.
On the other hand, it would be challenging to call cell-based meat
anything other than meat because cell-based meat has the same
composition as actual meat from slaughtered animals, and the starting

150. It is likely that consumers being misled by the term “cell-based meat” will decrease after cellbased meat has been in the market for a significant length of time.
151. See supra Part III-A for a full-length analysis.
152. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (the third
prong of the Central Hudson Test).
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material is animal muscle tissue or animal stem cells.153
Unlike plant-based meat, it is difficult to determine other alternatives
to labeling cell-based meat without using the term “meat.” There is not a
non-animal source to identify cell-based meat, unlike plant-based meat
where terms such as “soy protein” or “pea protein” are available.
Therefore, it is difficult to balance Arkansas’ interest and the restrictions
that Arkansas is placing on cell-based meat producers’ ability to advertise
their products. Courts analyzing this issue could reasonably decide that
Act 501 passes or fails the final prong of the Central Hudson Test.
However, due to how challenging it would be for cell-based meat
producers to label their products without a meat term, it is likely that
courts would decide that Act 501 fails the final prong of the Central
Hudson Test and, therefore, that Act 501 is unconstitutional.
C. Act 501 is Unconstitutionally Vague, but Can Easily be Amended to
Become Constitutional
Courts are likely to find Act 501is vague, but only for the portion of
the regulation that states a company is misrepresenting what their product
is when they use a term “that is the same as or similar to a term that has
been used or defined historically in reference to a specific agricultural
product.”154 Tofurky’s argument that Act 501 does not clarify what terms
are too similar to a term that has been used to described meat in the past
is especially persuasive.155 For example, Tofurky argues it is unsure
whether it can continue to use the term “beetballs” on its products because
it is somewhat similar to the term “meatballs.”156 Arkansas would
probably determine that “beetballs” is not similar enough to “meatballs”
to prohibit Tofurky from using the term. However, whether “beetballs” is
too similar to “meatballs” could not be decided based on the text of the
statute. Therefore, if Tofurky continues to use “beetballs,” there is a risk
that Arkansas could determine that “beetballs” is too similar to
“meatballs” and claim that Tofurky is violating Act 501. Tofurky has no
way of actually knowing if “beetballs” is too similar to “meatballs” until
Arkansas enforces Act 501. Therefore, a court should find that Arkansas’
use of the term “similar” in Act 501 is unconstitutionally vague.
Tofurky also argues that Act 501 is vague because Act 501 does not
clarify how to treat terms that historically have been used by both the meat

153. Sharma et al., supra note 1, at 7600; see also Mayhall, supra note 4, at 168-69 (arguing that
cell-based meat should be labeled as “meat” because it has the same properties as meat from livestock).
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(10) (2020).
155. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
55, at 14.
156. Id.
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industry and other food industries.157 Tofurky provides examples of such
terms, including terms like patty, burger, and meat.158 While Tofurky’s
concern is valid, it is unlikely that terms that have historically and
commonly been used for both meat terms and non-meat terms would now
only be allowed to be used on meat products. First, this clause of Act 501
does not specifically state that only common terms for meat products are
protected from being used in other sectors of the food industry.159 Act 501
only states that if a term has historically been used with a specific
agricultural product, then the term cannot be used to describe a new or
different product.160 Therefore, if the term “patty” has been commonly
used in the confectionary industry, peppermint patties for example, and
the meat industry as another term for a hamburger, both industries should
be able to use the term moving forward and still be in compliance with
Act 501. Therefore, Tofurky’s argument stating Act 501 is vague because
it does not clarify how to handle terms that are used across multiple food
industries is not an effective argument.
Even though a court should find Act 501 unconstitutionally vague, Act
501 could be easily amended to maintain its goal. Additionally, Arkansas
argues that if a court finds Act 501 unconstitutionally vague because it
does not clarify how similar a term must be to the meat term to be in
violation of Act 501, the statute should be severable and the remainder of
it should be saved.161 Even though a court could decide that Act 501 is
unconstitutional in its entirety because it does not clarify what similar
means, it is unlikely to do so because that specific clause is a small portion
of Act 501 and easily severable from the rest of Act 501.162 Therefore, the
portion of Act 501 that prohibits the use of meat terms on products other
than meat from slaughtered livestock would still be valid. 163 Tofurky
would not benefit much from that specific section being deemed
unconstitutional because it still would be unable to use many of the terms
that it wants to use on its products. Tofurky would not be able to use terms
like “sausage,” “deli slices,” or “ham” because historically those terms
have only been used with livestock-produced meat.164
Finally, even if the court decides that Act 501 is unconstitutional in its
157. Id. at 13 – 14.
158. Id.
159. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(10) (2020).
160. Id.
161. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 94, at 24.
162. See id.
163. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(10) is what would be deemed unconstitutional while ARK. CODE
ANN. § 2-1-305(6) is the section of Act 501 that prohibits the use of meat terms on non-meat products.
164. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note10, at 10-11. These are all
terms that Tofurky currently uses on their labels. Tofurky would still have to change their labels to remove
these terms even if they won their vagueness argument.
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entirety, Arkansas could easily amend the statute to no longer be vague.
Arkansas could either define how similar is too similar for terms
historically associated with an agricultural product, or remove the term
“similar” from the statute altogether. If Arkansas amended Act 501 in
either of these ways, then Act 501 would no longer be unconstitutionally
vague. Therefore, even though a court should find that Act 501 is
unconstitutionally vague regarding the use of the term “similar,” Tofurky
and cell-based meat producers would still not be able to use meat terms
on their products. Tofurky’s vagueness argument will not help them to be
able to use meat terms on their products. While this Section focused only
on Tofurky, the same analysis would apply if cell-based meat producers
argued that Act 501 is unconstitutionally vague.
D. Alternatives to Act 501 and their Advantages and Disadvantages
This section will discuss narrower, alternative options that states could
enact instead of statutes like Act 501. First, a potential regulation could
state that meat terms cannot be used in a misleading way. Another option
would be to require a specific disclaimer when a plant-based or cell-based
meat producer uses meat terms. Other states have used both these options
and have either been held constitutional by courts or have been solutions
in settlements between plant-based meat producers and governments.165
1. Prohibiting the Use of Meat Terms in a Way that Misleads Customers
The first way that a state could more narrowly regulate the use of meat
terms on products that are not made from the slaughter of livestock is to
just state that meat terms cannot be used in misleading ways. The
advantage with stating only that meat terms cannot be used in a
misleading way is that it gives both cell-based and plant-based meat
producers flexibility to determine the best way to label their products. As
long as producers are labeling their products clearly and in a way that
consumers know that the product is not meat from slaughtered livestock,
the producers are in compliance with the regulation. Additionally, under
the misleading standard, cell-based and plant-based meat producers will
165. See Wimer, supra note 7 (stating that Upton Natural v. Bryant was dropped because the
Mississippi Department of Agriculture plans to replace the regulation forbidding the use of meat terms on
plant-based foods with a revised regulation allowing meat terms on plant-based products as long as the
label includes disclaimers such as “meat-free,” “plant-based,” “vegetarian,” etc. as well); see also Turtle
Island Foods v. Richardson, No. 2:18-cv-04173, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224840 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 30,
2019) (Order denying motion for preliminary injunction stating that Missouri’s regulation is likely
constitutional because they only prohibit using meat terms in a misleading way. Plant-based meat
producers can use meat terms on their products as long as they aren’t using the terms in a misleading
way.).
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not have to change labels based on the state in which they are selling. This
standard does not require specific wording on the label. Therefore,
producers can use one label for every state that adopts this standard
because no specific disclaimers are required.
However, using the standard that only requires meat terms be used in a
misleading way may be unconstitutional because it could be considered
vague. Plant-based and cell-based meat producers may not think that their
labeling is misleading, but the enforcing agency could determine that it is
misleading. Therefore, plant-based and cell-based producers may not
realize that they are not in compliance with the state’s regulation. The
prohibition on vague laws is to ensure that a person knows if they are
violating a law prior to enforcement.166 Without a proper definition of
“misleading” that is easily applied, plant-based and cell-based meat
producers could potentially be at the subjective whim of parties enforcing
the statute to determine if their label is misleading.
Prohibiting the use of meat terms in a misleading way is the logical
solution for plant-based products. The main reason that prohibiting the
use of meat terms in a misleading way is logical for plant-based meat
products is because plant-based meat products have been in the market
for decades.167 Therefore, plant-based meat products are well known and
have used meat terms in non-misleading ways for a long time. 168 There
are many examples of plant-based meat labels that are not considered
misleading in which enforcing agencies could look at to determine
whether a plant-based meat label is misleading.169 Also, consumers are
familiar with plant-based products. Therefore, consumers understand
what they are buying as long as the plant-based meat product identifies
the product as plant-based, vegetarian, or another equivalent term.
Additionally, plant-based meat producers have an incentive to label
their products clearly because many consumers are specifically looking
to purchase plant-based meats.170 It is extremely unlikely that plant-based

166. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (stating that laws need to give
citizens fair warning of what is prohibited by the law).
167. See Olayanju, supra note 1 (stating that meat alternatives have been available beginning in the
early to mid-1900s).
168. See Turtle Island Foods v. Richardson, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224840, at *17 - 18 (Order
denying motion for preliminary injunction) (Missouri’s statute is an example of a statute that only
prohibits meat terms from being used in a misleading way. The preliminary injunction was denied because
Tofurky’s labels were clearly labeled as plant based and not misleading).
169. See, e.g., BEYOND BURGER, https://www.beyondmeat.com/products/the-beyond-burger/
[https://perma.cc/TBY9-VD7Q] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020). This site has a picture of beyond burger’s
label. While the term “burger” is on the packaging, “plant-based patties” is also on the label in large letters
that would be difficult for a consumer to miss. This is just one of many examples of plant-based food
products within grocery stores that are clearly labeled in a non-misleading way.
170. See Retail Sales Data, supra note 3 (Stating that retail sales of plant-based meat increased by
eighteen percent in 2019 while retail sales of conventional meat grew by 2.7%).
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meat producers would not clearly label their products as plant-based
because they rely on consumers knowing that their product is plant-based
to sell their product. Because plant-based products have been clearly
labeled for years, and consumers generally know what plant-based meat
is, it is logical to have a flexible standard for plant-based meat labeling by
just requiring that the meat terms used are not misleading. By having a
more flexible standard, plant-based meat producers should not need to
change their labels because their labels are already not misleading.
Therefore, stating that it is illegal to use meat terms in a misleading way
allows most plant-based meat producers to continue using their current
labels, while also ensuring that plant-based meat producers are not trying
to pass-off their products as meat from slaughtered livestock.
However, the standard stating meat terms cannot be used in a
misleading way is not an effective way to regulate cell-based meat
products. Because cell-based meat products have not entered the market
yet,171 cell-based meat products do not have the years of non-misleading
labels for enforcing agencies to compare with new labels that might be
misleading. Therefore, it is likely that determining whether a label on cellbased meat is misleading will be more subjective than for plant-based
meat. There are likely to be more situations where cell-based meat
producers truly think that they are compliant with a statute only requiring
meat terms not be used in a misleading way, but the enforcement agency
subjectively determines that the label is misleading. If this happens, there
is no precedent to determine whether the label is truly misleading.
Additionally, consumers are more likely to be confused about whether
cell-based meat is from slaughtered livestock than plant-based meat for
two reasons. First, because cell-based meat has not yet entered the market,
consumers are unfamiliar with cell-based meat’s composition and origin.
Second, cell-based meat is grown from animal stem cells or muscle tissue
and is intended to look and taste exactly like meat from slaughtered
animals.172 Therefore, it may be harder for consumers to distinguish
between meat from slaughtered animals and cell-based meat, even if cellbased meat producers do not believe that they are using meat terms in a
misleading way. Therefore, it would be more logical to have a statute that
specifically determines how cell-based meat should be labeled.
2. Requiring a Disclaimer
Another alternative to forbidding the use of meat terms on plant-based
171. Danley, supra note 5 (stating that multiple companies are expecting to have cell-based meat
products in the market between 2021 – 2025).
172. Mayhall, supra note 4, at 168 (arguing that cell-based meat should be labeled as meat because
scientifically it is meat).
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and cell-based meat products is to require a disclaimer on plant-based and
cell-based meat products that use meat terms. Statutes could vary as to
how specific the disclaimer must be. For example, a statute could just
generically require a disclaimer. If the statute requiring a disclaimer was
that broad, there would not be much of a difference from requiring that
meat terms not be used in a misleading way because many plant-based
meat producers use disclaimers with their meat terms to avoid misleading
consumers.173 However, states could also require a specific disclaimer on
the label of plant-based and cell-based meat products. The advantage of
requiring a specific disclaimer is that it is clear how the state requires
plant-based or cell-based meat producers to label their products if they are
using meat terms. There is no subjective evaluation that enforcement
officials would have to make to determine if the label with the meat term
is misleading. Therefore, it would be easy for cell-based and plant-based
meat producers to evaluate whether they comply with the regulation.
The biggest disadvantage to requiring a specific disclaimer is that
different states could have different disclaimers, leading to inconsistent
obligations for manufacturers. In this scenario, plant-based and cell-based
meat producers likely would have to print different labels for different
states. This would come at a huge cost to the producers. Additionally, if
each state required a different label, it would make it logistically
challenging for plant-based and cell-based meat producers to ensure that
they correctly label each product going into different states. This may
result in plant-based and cell-based meat producers deciding to limit
where they sell their products to states that use the same label. 174 One way
to avoid having different disclaimer requirements in different states is for
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) or United States Department
of Agriculture (“USDA”) to make a regulation with one disclaimer
required on plant-based and cell-based meat products nationwide.175 To
173. The analysis for a generic disclaimer is similar to having a regulation prohibiting the use of
meat terms in a misleading way. For that reason, this section will only analyze regulations that require a
specific disclaimer. However, some of the states’ legislation surrounding the use on meat terms only
require that a disclaimer be used without specifying what the disclaimer must be. See Wimer, supra note
7 (stating that Upton Natural v. Bryant was dropped because the Mississippi Department of Agriculture
plans to replace the regulation forbidding the use of meat terms on plant-based foods with a revised
regulation allowing meat terms on plant-based products as long as the label includes terms like “meatfree,” “plant-based,” “vegetarian,” etc. as well).
174. Disclaimers that may deter manufacturers from selling their products in more than one state
may be deemed unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause. At its most basic, the dormant
commerce clause states that state laws which excessively hinder interstate commerce are unconstitutional.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58, §5.3.1; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra
note10, at 15 (Tofurky also argued that Act 501 is unconstitutional because it violates the dormant
commerce clause. However, Tofurky’s dormant commerce clause argument was not one of its main
arguments. Therefore, this paper does not cover the dormant commerce clause in detail).
175. The FDA regulates all plant-based foods. See Regulated Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/industry/import-basics/regulated-products [https://perma.cc/3VPL-G79C]
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be effective, this regulation must preempt any state regulations requiring
a different disclaimer. This solution would make it much easier for plantbased and cell-based meat producers to comply with regulations.
Requiring a specific disclaimer, however, is not the best option for
plant-based meat products. First, plant-based meat products already
effectively use a variety of disclaimers.176 Therefore, there is no reason to
require plant-based meat products to have a specific disclaimer. Since
these disclaimers are already effective, plant-based meat producers
should have the option to use any of the existing effective disclaimers and
not be forced to spend money to switch their labels to a new one. The
FDA is unlikely to make a regulation requiring such a disclaimer for the
same reason—existing disclaimers already work. For these reasons, plantbased meat products should have flexibility in labeling their plant-based
meat products and should not be forced to use specific disclaimers on their
products.
While requiring disclaimers for plant-based meat products is
unnecessary, requiring cell-based meat products to have a specific
disclaimer on their label is the most logical option. First, because cellbased meat is more likely to confuse consumers once it enters the market,
having a standardized label will allow consumers to easily determine
which meat is cell-based and which meat is from slaughtered livestock.
Consumers will only have to learn to recognize one disclaimer to
recognize cell-based meat.177 Additionally, it may be helpful to require a
disclaimer that explains what cell-based meat is because cell-based meat
is a new product. An example of a disclaimer that would help consumers
know what they are buying is requiring cell-based meat producers to call
their products “cell-based meat,” and then state “cell-based meat is meat
that is grown from animal stem cells in a laboratory.” Requiring a label
like this would help consumers recognize cell-based meat and inform
them about what they are buying. Ideally, the USDA would require a
specific disclaimer at a national level. If the USDA develops the
disclaimer, it will eliminate the concern of cell-based meat producers
having to make multiple labels to comply with each state’s specific
disclaimer. Indeed, the USDA is currently writing regulations for cellbased meat, and it would be logical to include a specific disclaimer
(last updated Aug. 3, 2018). The FDA and USDA have agreed to collaborate to regulate cell-based meats
together. At this point it is likely that the USDA will oversee regulating labels. See Elaine Watson, So the
FDA and USDA will Share Oversight for Cell-Based Meat . . . but what will this mean in Practice,
FOODNAVIGATOR (July 30, 2019), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2019/01/03/So-the-FDAand-USDA-will-share-oversight-for-cell-based-meat-but-what-will-this-mean-in-practice#
[https://perma.cc/UP4Y-EX54].
176. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note10, at 10-11 (shows
examples of Tofurky’s labels. All the labels contain that the products are plant-based or vegetarian).
177. There are multiple synonyms for cell-based meat such as cultured meat and lab-grown meat.
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requirement in those regulations.178 Because cell-based meat is a novel
product, regulations requiring cell-based meat products to have a specific
disclaimer on their labels is the best option for clarity for both cell-based
meat producers and consumers.
IV. CONCLUSION
As consumers look for alternatives to meat products, plant-based and
cell-based meats have become popular options. States should be careful
as to how they regulate the use of meat terms on plant-based and cellbased products to avoid litigation challenging the constitutionality of their
statutes. States risk being sued by both plant-based and cell-based meat
producers if they are not thoughtful in how meat terms are regulated.
Based on the analysis in Part III of this Article, it is likely unconstitutional
for states to completely ban the use of meat terms on plant-based or cellbased meat products. Therefore, any restrictions that states place on the
use of meat terms should be done in a way that allows both plant-based
and cell-based meat products to use meat terms in a non-misleading way.
Additionally, states should regulate the use of meat terms on cell-based
meat and plant-based meat differently. Because plant-based meat
products have been available for decades and consumers are familiar with
plant-based meat products,179 the most effective way to regulate plantbased meat products is to require that their labels do not use meat terms
in misleading ways. Many plant-based meat producers already use meat
terms in non-misleading ways. This regulation will maintain this status
quo. However, cell-based meat products should be more carefully
regulated because they are new and unfamiliar to consumers. Therefore,
meat terms should be allowed on cell-based meat labels if the label has a
disclaimer clearly labeling it as cell-based. Ideally, the disclaimer would
also give a short explanation of what cell-based meat is. The USDA
should enact regulations requiring one uniform, national disclaimer. This
disclaimer should preempt any other disclaimers mandated by state
legislatures.

178. Watson, supra note 175.
179. Olayanju, supra note 1.
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